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A free trade agreement supports global free trade since trade barriers tend to divert trade
in favor of members, but not reduce imports. The tam: mutual assured deterrence' is used to
refer to a regional free trade association that has the feature that no member can gain individually
from the imposition of a barrier against a non-member. Mutual assured deterrence is shown to
be possible for a surprisingly rich set of partners.
A customs union is compatible with global free trade if the vast majority of trade takes
place naturally within the confmes of the association. A customs union that is likely to have this
property would combine countries to form a nearly exact economic replica of the globe.
The economic combination of Mexico and the United States doesn't form a replica of the
global economy because, compared with Asia, North America has relatively high capital per
worker even after adding the Mexican workforce. However, NAFTA does seem to have the
property of mutual assured deterrence, and may for that reason amount to a commitment to global
free trade as well as regional free trade.
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There is an eerie sense of deja vu that accompanies the splitting
of the world into three regional trading blocs organized around the
principal protagonists of a drama of another sort: the United States,
Japan and Germany.
But regionalism can be compatible with globalism. Indeed
regionalism may be the only route by which a global economy can be
achieved because of the political constraints and complexities that make
global trade agreements like GAfl difficult to craft and even wore
difficult to enforce.
Regionalism implies globalism when regional trading associations
are formed that minimize the incentives for erecting barriers against
non-members. Krugman(199la) observes that if customs unions seek to
exploit monopoly power in their external markets then it is undesirable
to have either too many or too few customs unions. As the number of
customs unions (including separate countries) diminishes, each gets2
larger and the degree of monopoly power in the external markets
increases, as do tariff levels. But also as the number of customs
unions diminishes, more and more trade is internal to the blocs and not
subject to barriers. These offsetting forces can produce a complicated
relationship between world welfare and the number of customs unions, but
Krugman offers a provocative example in which the worst number is three!
Krugman(1991b) has a different tone, emphasizing the substantial effect
of distance on trade patterns. If most trade is naturally among close
neighbors, and if associations are formed on a regional basis, then
these associations may protect most of world trade from government
interference.
This paper presents another argument why a free trade agreement
may be very supportive of globalism. A free trade agreement allows
members to select their own barriers against non-members. Barriers that
are raised by one country alone may only divert trade away from non-
members toward other members but not protect the market of the country
that erects the barrier. Such a country would have a reduced incentive
to impose barriers, whether the barriers are intended to exploit
external monopoly power or to redistribute income.
The two-good model of Vanek(1965) captures the spirit of the
deterrence idea being discussed here.2 Suppose that C is a large
country that determines the world terms of trade, that B is a smaller
version of C with the same autarchic price ratios, and that A has
different factor supplies and different autarchic price ratios. If A
and 3 form a free trade agreement, and A imposes barriers against
imports from C, A's trade is diverted away from C in favor of B. This
2 SeeCorden(1984) for references and a review of the literature on two-
good and three-good customs unions.3
benefits B, the country that does not trade with the outsider, at the
expense of A, the country imposing the barriers. The benefits to A in
terms of income redistribution may be worth the cost, even with this
trade diversion effect. However, since the costs are higher with the
free trade agreement than without, we may conclude that the barriers
against C imposed by A will be less if the free trade agreement is in
place.
More explicitly, if there is a free trade agreement between Mexico
and the United States, barriers to imports of apparel, for example, into
the United States from Asia might primarily divert trade from Asia in
favor of Mexico but have little protective effect in the U.S.
marketplace. In that event, the free trade agreement between the United
States and Mexico greatly reduces the benefits to U.S. apparel
manufacturers that come from trade barriers erected against Asian
products and these barriers are much less likely to be erected. After
all, why should U.S. manufacturers go to all the trouble to petition for
protection from Asian products, when all that protection does is to
increase competition from Mexico? Generally, U.S. barriers against
Asian products are likely to be lower with the North American Free Trade
Agreement than without. Offsetting that effect from the Asian
perspective is the preferential treatment given to Mexican products.
1 propose to borrow from another literature the term: "mutual
assured deterrence" to refer to a regional free trade association that
has the feature that no member can gain individually from the imposition
of a barrier against a non-member. You may suspect that mutual assured
deterrence is very difficult to achieve, but your thinking probably does
not take into account the fact that a barrier erected by one member4
creates an incentive for other members to ship all of their production
to the protected, high-priced marketplace, and to import from non-
members low-priced goods for consumption purposes. When this effect is
properly taken into account, mutual assured deterrence is possible for a
surprisingly rich set of partners.
If the regional association is a customs union, with common
external barriers, the concept of mutual assured deterrence is
inapplicable. For customs unions, two arguments are presented why
regional associations may promote globalism. One possibility is that
the customs union is formed in a way such that the vast majority of
trade takes place naturally within the confines of the association.
Then there is very little reason to erect barriers against non-members
because the barriers would have little effect. A customs union that is
likely to have this property would combine countries to form a nearly
exact economic replica of the globe, thereby eliminating most of the
reason for external trade. Incidentally, as Krugman(l99lb) observes,
the regional aspect of "regionalism" is an important feature since most
trade naturally takes place over fairly short distances. A customs
union between the United States and Mexico is much more likely for this
reason to be supportive of globalism than is an association between the
United States and Russia, since the later willencompass a much smaller
share of the members trade.
Another reason why a customs union may be less likely to erect
barriers against non-members is that members may have conflicting
interests that tend to offset each other. In the EEC, apparel sold in
the United Kingdom will come from Portugal or from Asia but will not be
produced much in the U.K. The EEC debate over the erection of barriers5
against Asian apparel thus pits U.K. consumers against Portuguese
producers, which may be more of a standoff than a watch between U.K.
consumers and U.K. producers.
Two intellectual tools are helpful in elucidating these ideas.
First there is the Stolper-Sanuelson theorem which maps changes in goods
prices induced by trade barriers into changes in factor earnings. The
traditional Stolper-Sainuelson theorem is not perfectly suited to the
study of regional associations because it is based on an implicit
assumption that earnings come entirely from the supply of labor services
or entirely from the supply of capital earnings. It is not difficult to
adopt the result to deal with regions with mixed ownership of capital
and labor. Not surprisingly, regions with relatively large supply of
labor prefer high prices for labor intensive goods. Regional Stolper-
Samuelson theorems are the subject of the next section.
Sections III, IV and V examine regional associations using several
different kinds of economic models including partial equilibrium, one-
cone Heckscher-Ohlin general equilibrium and multicone Heckscher-Ohlin
general equilibrium models, with and without internal factor mobility.
It will be shown that if association members are large enough to satisfy
the demand for imports from third countries, then the discriminatory
barriers are completely ineffective since they divert but do not destroy
trade.
After all this heavy-duty economic theory, Section VI wraps up
with some empirical evidence regarding the propüsed North American Free
Trade Agreement. The economic combination of Mexico and the United
States doesn't seem to form a replica of the global economy because,
compared with Asia, North America has relatively high capital perworkereven after adding the Mexican workforce. However, Mexico does seem
large enough to satisfy a substantial share of U.S. demand for labor
intensive manufactures and for that reason the NAFTA may serve as a
major deterrent to the erection of U.S. barriers against Asia.
II. STOLPER-SMUELSON WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP
The Lerner-Pearce diagram in Figure 1 is a standard graphical
setting in which to demonstrate the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. On this
figure are drawn unit-value isoquants for two products. These unit-
value isoquants are combinations of capital and labor that are required
to produce a unit value of output. For ease of graphing primarily,
these are drawn as right angles indicating that there are no
substitution possibilities in either sector. Machinery is assumed to be
the capital intensive sector with a fixed capital per worker which is
higher than textiles. Also on this diagram is drawn a unit cost line
through the corners of the two unit-value isoquants. This is the only
unit cost line that is compatible with the production of both goods at
zero profits. The equation for this isocost line is 1 —wL-t. r K, where
w is the wage rate and r is the capital rental rate. This line
accordingly crosses the labor axis at 1/v and the capital axis at hr.
both of which are labelled in the figure.
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem postulates an increase in the price
of textiles, for example, and computes the induced changes in the factor
earnings. In Figure 1, the increase in the price of textiles shifts the
unit-value isoquant for textiles inward to the dotted right-angle,
indicating that it takes less capital and labor to produce a unit value
of textiles after the price goes up. This is accompanied by a shift in
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the unit isocost to the dotted line, which can be seen implies a higher
wage rate( w'>w) and a lower return on capital. Thus;
The Stolyer-Samuelspn Theorem: A rise in the price of a product gives
rise to an increase in the (real) earnings of the factor used
intensively in that product and a reduction in the (real) earnings
of the other factor.
The Stolper-Samuelson result implicitly is based on the assumption
of pure ownership; An individual either supplies only labor services or
only capital services. It is not difficult to amend the result to deal
with mixed ownership. The unit cost lines can be interpreted as the
combinations of factors that can earn enough to purchase either a unit
value of machinery or a unit value of textiles. The solid line unit
cost line thus represents combinations of factors that can purchase
either a unit of machinery or a unit of textiles at the original prices.
Since the price of machinery is unchanged1 the initial and final unit
cost lines represent ownership needs for the purchase of a like amount
of machinery. These two lines have one point in càmmon: the point
labelled H where the ownership ratio is equal to the input ratio in
machinery. Thus a person who consumed only machinery and who owned a
combination of factors that were just suited to machinery production
would be unaffected by this price increase in textiles. If this
machinery-consuming individual owned more capital, she could buy less
machinery after the price increase in textiles. If this individual
owned more labor, then she could buy more machinery after the price
change.
Another line is necessary to discuss the factor needs to purchase
the original amount textiles because the new unit cost line refers to8
textiles that are sold at higher prices. To determine the ownership
needs to purchase the old quantity of textiles it is necessary to draw a
line parallel to the new unit cost line through the corner of the old
textiles unit value isoquant. This line is labelled "Ownership Needs
for Textile Consumption.This line crosses the original unit cost line
at the point T. Thus a person who consumed only textiles and who owned
a combination of factors that were just suited to textile production
would be unaffected by this price increase in textiles. If this
textile-consuming individual owned more capital, she could buy less
textiles after the price increase. If she owned more labor, then she
could buy more textiles.
Incidentally, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem refers to the points
where these two consumption lines cross the two axes: If only labor is
owned, the price increase in textiles leaves one better off regardless
of the consumption good, but relatively better off in machinery
consumption than textile consumption.
The following results come straightforwardly from Figure 1:
StolDer-Samuelson Theorem with Extreme Ownershin:If ownership of the
factors lies outside the interval between the capital/labor ratios
of the two industries, an increase in the price of the labor
intensive good increases the real earnings of labor abundant
individuals and reduces the real earnings of capital abundant
individuals, regardless of the good consumed.
Stoloer-SamuelsonTheorem with Intermediate Ownershiv:If ownership of
the factors lies between the intensity ratios in the two
industries,then an increase in the price of the labor-intensive
goodincreases the real consumption power in terms of the labor-9
intensive good but lowers the real consumption power in terms of
the capital-intensive good.
III.A PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF A FREE TRADEAGREEMENT
Asecond tool for studying regional associations is the partial
equilibrium diagram, Figures 2 and 3,whichindicate the effect ofa
free trade agreement between the United States and Mexico in a setting
in which the United States has an external barrier but Mexico has none.
These figures convey the important message that the effect of the PTA on
the United States depends critically on the economic size of Mexico.3
Figure 2 indicates the effect of a ETA when the form of the U.S.
protection is a tariff. In this figure the world price and the U.S.
protected price are illustrated with horizontal lines. The downward
sloping curve is the U.S. import demand and the two upward sloping lines
are alternative Mexican supply curves. If Mexico is small and has the
supply curve close to the vertical axis, then, prior to the
establishment of the FTA, Mexican production would be AR and U.S. import
demand would be CE. A portion of the Mexican supply would go to
satisfying home demand and, if there is any left over, the rest might
find its way to the U.S. market. After the ETA, all the Mexican output
is sold at the high U.S. prices and Mexican demand is satisfied at the
world price from third sources. The Mexican supply to the U.S. market
increases to CD which crowds out third country exports to the U.S. The
total trade diversion is between CD and CD- AD, the latter figure
applicable if all the Mexican product were sold in the U.S. market prior
to the PTA. The facts are that very little of Mexican product is
Discussion like this can be found in McCulloch and Pinera(1977) who
offer a partial equilibrium treatment of the tariff case. Gardner and
Kimbrough(1990) do the general equilibrium case.10
currently sold in the U.S. and the larger figure CD seems applicable.
On the other hand, the simple diagram includes no transportation and
marketing costs which would encourage home sales and which would prevent
all the Mexican product from being sold in the U.S.
If this first supply curve is applicable, then the PTA would not
affect the prices at which goods sell inside the United States. Rut now
move the Mexican supply to the right. At some point it will intersect
the U.S. demand at the point E where all U.S. import demand is satisfied
from Mexican sources. Further increases in Mexican supply will drive
down the U.S. internal price. If the Mexican supply curve goes through
the point F on the U.S. import demand curve then the world price would
prevail in the U.S. markets. Further increases in Mexican supply would
not cause further reductions in the U.S. price since Mexican suppliers
would not sell at any price lower than the one prevailing in the world
market. The dashed line in the lower right of Figure 2 illustrates this
case. Total Mexican supply is AG. The amount Al is sold in the U.S.
market at world prices and the remainder FC is sold partly at home and
partly in third markets. From this figure we derive the following
important conclusion: If Mexico is large enough that she can conDletely
satisfy inciient import demand of the U.S. that would occur at world
parket prices, then an PTA would completely dismantle U.S. Drotection.
A substantially different description applies to the quota case
illustrated in Figure 3. Here the quota is assumed to be quantity EG
and prices inside the U.S. market are adjusted so that import supply and
import demand are equalized. This quota level is selected to create an
initial equilibrium equivalent to the tariff equilibrium depicted in
Figure 2. With the formation of the PTA, the equivalence of the quota11
and tariff breaks down. The smallest amount of Mexican supply
supplements the quota-restricted imports and puts downward pressure on
U.S. prices. The flA price can be found in Figure 3 by defining U.S.
import demand net of Mexican supply and then selecting a U.S. price that
equates net demand to the quota level. This import price is lower than
the U.S. protected price, even though Mexico is too small to satisfy
total U.S. import demand. Note that by moving the Mexican supply to the
right, one may conclude that the U.S. price reverts to the unprotected
world market price if Mexican supply Is enough to make up the difference
between the U.S. import demand that would occur at the world price and
the quota level of imports. In the extreme, if the quota level is zero,
then we revert to the tariff conclusion: The world price prevails if
Mexico is large enough to satisfy completely U.S. import demand at the
world market price.
IV. REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS; ONE CONE HECKSCItER-OHLIN MODEL
The partial equilibrium analysis of the effect of a free trade
agreement can be interestingly introduced into the "one-cone" Heckscher-
Ohlin model depicted in Figure 4. This "one-cone" model uses the
assumption that all countries have endowment supplies falling between
the capital/labor ratios in the two industries. In this model, a
regional association that had a combined supply of capital and labor
with exactly the same capital/labor ratio as the world totals would be a
holographic replica of the world's economy and would not need to engage
in trade with any non-members, provided of course that taste differences
are not a source of trade. Since the autarchic prices of this regional
association are the same as the world's prices, there would be no trade
external to the association and no effect of trade barriers. Ifbarriers were already in place before the regional association were
formed, the barriers might remain, although they would have the effect
only of hastening the adjustment to the new equilibrium in which there
is substantial trade among the members of the association and very
little trade otherwise. Incidentally, just as openness is not properly
measured by trade dependence1 globalism is not properly measured by the
amount of extra-association trade, which in the case just considered
would be zero even if the association were completely open.
A. Customs Union
If the combined regional factor supply were not a replica of the
world's total factor supply, then the regional association would have a
demand for imports from non-members. The two tools that were discussed
in the previous two sections would then became applicable, first the
Stolper Samuelson Theorem and then the analysis of trade diversion. If
the association is a customs union with common external barriers then
the regional Stolper Samuelson theorem indicates the conditions under
which the trade barriers have the greatest effect on redistributing
income between regions, namely when the factor ownership patterns are
very different among regions. It seems natural to surmise that
disparity in regional effects tends to reduce barriers since it
encourages regional coalitions in opposition. Of course, it is possible
that this would work in the opposite way: The greater the regional
redistributive effect of the barrier, the more likely that it will be
erected.
B. Free Trade Agreement
If the association is a free trade agreement, barriers erected by
one member against non-members may only divert trade in favor of members
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but have no protective effect. This was discussed using partial
equilibrium models in the context of Figures 2 and 3. Figure 4 is a
general equilibrium analog of these two diagrams. Here we have the
United States and Mexico both with factor supplies located inside the
cone swept out by the expansion vectors for machinery and for textiles.
On this diagram is drawn also a line representing the world's ratio of
capital to labor. The vector connecting the U.S. factor supply point
with this world factor supply line is the tJS. net imports of factor
services. As drawn, the U.S. is abundant in capital, exports capital
services and imports labor services. This service flow is accomplished
by exporting the capital intensive good, machinery, and importing the
labor intensive good, textiles.
Suppose now that the United States were to impose trade barriers
against the imports of textiles from Asia. This would tend to divert
textile trade toward Mexico. Is the diversion effect enough to
completely undo the U.S. protectionism? The answer is yes if Mexican
total supply of textiles is enough to satisfy the U.S. import demand.
The U.S. import demand for textiles can be found by transferring the
U.S. net factor import vector to the origin and by expressing this
vectoras a combination of the two industry expansion vectors.4 This
In terms of algebra, the production side of the Reckscher-Ohlin-Vanek
model takes the form AO.. —VwhereA is the matrix in input vectors,
isthe Mexican factor supty vector andis the corresponding
levelof outputs. This express the factor sup).y V as a combination
of the columns of A with weights equal to the output levels Q,_.
Anotherway of saying this is that the total factor supply V is
allocated between the two industries with each industry capital/labor
ratio given. This produces the allocation of Mexican capital and labor
to the Textile sector as illustrated in Figure 5. The analogous
equation for U.S. trade is AT —V where T is the trade vector,
s is the consumption share andvj.sthe world's factor supply. The
excess factor supply vector V -sV, is depicted in Figure 5 linking the
U.S. endowment point with theUline representing the world's factor
ratios. Tradebalanceis implicitly being assumed since theU.S.factor14
allows us to find in the figure the supply of factors that could produce
U.S. textile imports. The same kind of vector addition allows us to
find the allocation of Mexican factors to the production of textiles.
In Figure 4 Mexican production of textiles is larger than U.S. textile
imports, and U.S. barriers would accordingly be completely circumvented
by Mexican supply.
In figure 5 this construction is extended to identify the kinds of
U.S. partners that would render completely ineffective any barriers that
the U.S. mighterectagainst non-members. The shaded region represents
the factor endowments of all countries that have enough production of
textiles to fully satisfy U.S. import demand. It should be noted that
this set includes countries that, absent any trade barriers, would be
importers, not exporters of textiles. In a free trade agreement with
the United States, these countries would export enough of their own
textile product to satisfy U.S. demand and would import that amount and
more from non-members to satisfy local consumption needs. Of course,
local content restrictions would prevent simple transhipment ofproduct
through association members into to the United States, but these local
content restrictions do not limit imports for local consumption.
Accordingly the set of partners that would undo U.S. protectionism seems
very large indeed.
This deterrence works in the other direction also. The
possibility of U.S. exports to its partners deters their use of
barriers, provided that the partner's trade is less than U.S. productiàn
supply point and the U.S. consumption point sV are on the same cost
line: w'(Vsv) —0where v is the vector of factor rewards. Just as
in the case of outputs, the U.S. excess factorsupply is decomposed into
the sum of two vectors, one representing the factors neededto produce
the textile imports and the otherrepresenting the factors need to
produce the machinery imports.15
levels. For example, in Figure 5 the usual vector addition is used to
find the level of U.S. production of machinery and the corresponding
partner net trade in factor services that is associated with this level
of imports. The partner's factor supply must be at least this close to
the world factor supply line in order to assure a smaller partner level
of machinery imports than U.S. production. Similarly, if the partner is
an importer, of textiles, its factor supply vector must be not so far
above the world factor supply line that its imports of textiles exceed
the U.S. supply.
The shaded region in Figure 6 is found by intersecting the (Figure
4) set of partners that deter U.S. barriers with the set of partners
that are deterred by the U.S. from imposing barriers. This identifies a
set of regional free trade agreements that have the property of "mutual
assured deterrence", to borrow from another literature that has now lost
its relevance. This set of U.S. partners for mutual assured deterrence
seems very large. A partner cannot be too small. A partner has to be
more labor abundant than the United States. If the partner is much
smaller than the U.S., then it must be very labor abundant. If the
partner is large compared with the U.S., then it must be moderately
endowed in factors: not too labor abundant nor too capital abundant.
V. REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS: A MULTI- CONE HECKSCHER-OHLIN MODEL
The one-cone Heckscher-Ohlin model leaves a very optimistic view
of the effect of free trade agreements on global efficiency. Other
models may suggest different conclusions. In this section, we explore
the two-factor four-good multi-cone Heckscher-Ohlin model depicted in
Figure 7. Here it is assumed that there are three kinds of countries:
(1) Low-wage countries produce a labor-intensive mix of products,16
apparel and textiles. (2) Moderate wage countries produce an
intermediate mix of products: textiles and machinery. (3) High-wage
countries produce a capital intensive mix of products: machinery and
chemicals. In the figure are drawn arrows representing the factor
endowments of Mexico and the United States. Mexico is placed in the
low-wage cone and the United States is placed in the high-wage cone.
What happens when Mexico and the United States are combined into a
regional trade association that imposes trade barriers against the
products imported from non-members? Under what conditions do these
barriers have absolutely no effect? Does the regional association make
it more or less likely that its members will impose barriers against
non-members? The answers to these questions implied by the multi-cone
}-ieckscher-Ohlin model depend on whether the regional association
increases the mobility of factors among its members. Regional
associations with and without factor mobility.
A. Associations with Internal Factor Mobility
In Figure 7, Mexico and the United States are located in different
cones of diversification with different wage rates and different
compensation rates for capital. If the free trade agreement eliminates
the barriers to capital or to labor flows between these two countries
then Mexico and the United States form a new economic unit that lies in
one cone or the other. This regional associatIon cannot be a
holographic image of the world's economy and trade with non-members will
occur and may even be more than before the agreeuent. Barriers that are
erected against third country imports thus still have an effect after
the agreement is fully in place. But there are circumstances in which
these barriers might not be erected because they divert but do not17
protect or because they cause politically unacceptable regional income
redistribution.
In Figure 7 the arrow representing the U.S. and Mexico combined is
placed in the intermediate cone which is suited to the production of
textiles and machinery. This integrated equilibrium is created by a
combination of capital movements into Mexico from the United States
and/or labor migration into the United States from Mexico. Enough
factor flows have to occur to drag both the U.S. endowment point and the
Mexican endowment point into the intermediate cone. This factor
mobility thus implies lower wages in the United States and the loss of
its capital-intensive chemicals sector, possibly replaced by textiles if
the flow of Mexican migrant labor is great enough. Mexico ends up with
higher wages but loses the apparel sector. Mexico may produce textiles
if the capital flow from the United States is great enough. The figure
illustrates the more probable case of a capital flow out of the U.S.
that terminates when the U.S. endowment point just gets into the central
cone.
In the integrated equilibrium that is depicted in this figure,
both the United States and Mexico gain from the factor mobility. The
original US endowment point is located on the cc unit cost line,
indicating that the initial US GDP (and CR) is one unit. In the
integrated equilibrium, factor earnings equal one when the factor
combination lies on the bb unit cost line. You can see that in the
figure the dark arrow depicting the US total factor supply extends
beyond this bb line, the amount that it does so indicating the gain in
US factor earnings (GNI') as a result of the free trade agreement. If
the integrated equilibrium is accomplished by a capital flow out of the18
U.S., the GOP cannot rise however. The figure depicts this with U.S.
resident factor supplies earning less than one unit after integration.
Of course this reduction in resident earnings is more than offset by the
earnings of capital located in Mexico. Perhaps it bears repeating for
emphasis: The gains to the U.S. from the agreement are greater, the
farther is the U.S. endowment point from the integrated cone of
diversification (the machinery expansion ratio). But this additional
gain in CliP comes necessarily with a smaller CDP, with more and more
U.S. earnings coming in the form of repatriated capital earnings.
Mexico also gains overall from the association. The original
Mexican endowment point is not enough to produce a unitvalueof CDP
since it falls short of the aa curve defining the original Mexican unit
cost line. But in the integrated equilibrium, the Mexican total
earnings (CliP) jumps up to one unit,sincethe Mexican endowment point
is located on the bb curve. Mexican COP is even higher, but all those
additional earnings are owed to owners of U.S. capital.
The message here seems pretty accurate: Although both countries
will gain overall, U.S. labor and Mexican capital stand to lose from a
free trade agreement. Until the product mix is similar in Mexico and
the United States, we should be expecting capital flows south and labor
flows north.
1. Free Trade Agreement
Now consider the impact of trade barriers after achievement of the
integrated equilibrium depicted in Figure 7. In the integrated free-
trade equilibrium both the United States and Mexico have to import
chemicals and apparel from third sources. Either machinery or textiles
might be imported as well. The impact of barriers on machinery and19
textiles is similar to the two-product model discussed in the previous
section. The difference is that in this four-good model the import
levels of machinery and textiles are likely to be less since both
chemicals and apparel are necessarily imported and must be paid for with
exports of either machinery or textiles or both. Because the import
levels are less, the region of mutual assured deterrence depicted in
Figure 6 gets even greater, at least as it relates to protection of
machinery and textiles.
SThat about barriers against the other imports: Apparel and
Chemicals?Withlowbarriers there is no internal production at all
and these low barriers can only raise the prices that U.S. and Mexican
consumers have to pay. Suppose instead that the United States were to
impose barriers on imports of apparel that are great enough to justify
production and great enough possibly to raise wages. In the figure,
this means that the apparel isoquant is shifted inward to the point that
it touches the unit-isocost line. If it shifts in further, then the
Stolper-Samuelson effect would kick in and wages would go up in both the
United States and Mexico. With the higher wages, textile producers
would be forced out of business and production would concentrate on
machinery and apparel. There is a force, however, that works against
this outcome. All the apparel production of the association has to be
sold in the U.S. protected marketplace. If the U.S. demand at the high
price is not as high as the total association prduction, then it is
impossible to raise the price of apparel high enough to raise U.S. wages
unless protection were also granted to the textile sector.20
The bottom line here is that a free trade agreement implies
globalism, more strongly in the multi-product model with internal factor
flows than in the two-product one-cone model.
2. Customs Union
Next consider the case of a customs union with a common set of
external barriers. A tariff wall imposed on textile imports by both
Mexico and the United States must of course raise the price of textiles
in both countries and set in motion the identical Stolper-Samuelson
response in both locations. But the mixed regional incentives to impose
trade barriers may lower their chances of making it through the
legislative process. The reason there are mixed regional incentives is
that Mexico, even after factor migration, is relatively well endowed in
labor and has a relatively great incentive to seek measures that raise
the price of the labor intensive product.
B. Associations without Internal Mobility
Next consider the case without factor flows between Mexico and the
United States. Suppose as in Figure 7 that Mexico and the United States
are located in different cones of diversification. In the absence of
protection, neither textiles nor apparel are produced in the United
States and neither chemicals nor machinery are produced in Mexico.
Unlike the case with factor mobility, it is possible that Mexico and the
United States do not need to trade with third parties to reap completely
the gains from international exchange. One possibility is that Mexico
and the United States form an exact replica of the world economy. Even
if they do not, they may be able together to satisfy perfectly the
combined demand for all products at world prices.21
If the association does have external trade, then trade barriers
can have an effect. Barriers to imports of textiles and apparel may
raise the U.S. price high enough to support U.S. production of these
products. If both textiles and apparel are protected, the U.S. factor
prices apply to Mexican production. This represents a big gift to
Mexico from U.S. consumers. The size of this gift is measured in Figure
7 by the difference between the Mexican factor supply vector along the
bb cost line and along the cc cost line.
These high prices are sustainable only if Mexico is so small that
the marginal suppliers of textiles and apparel are third countries
subject to the trade barriers. If the association is a free trade
agreement, Mexico will export all product to the high-priced U.S.
marketplace and import for consumption purposes from cheap third
suppliers. All this output and more has to be absorbed by U.S.
consumers to sustain the prices in the U.S. If the association is a
customs union, then part of Mexican output is absorbed for Mexican
consumption purposes and less is available for the U.S. marketplace.
The cases in which oüly one of the products is protected are lift
as ext exercise.
VI. EVIDENCE
A smallamount ofevidence is provided in this final section
concerning the possibility of Mutual Assured Deterrence in the proposed
North American Free Trade Agreement. Figure 6 suests that MAD occurs
whenasmaller partner of the United States is not too small nor too
similar to the U.S. Figure 8 is intended informally to indicate if this
seems in fact to hold between the United States, Mexico and Canada.
This figure indicates the percentages of world totals of various factor22
supplies for various countries and regions. GDP figures are included as
an (imperfect) proxy for physical capital.
The United States is indicated by the darkest bars at the top of
the figure. The relatively long dark bars identify factors of
production in which the United States is abundantly supplied. Energy
leads the list with consumption slightly larger than production. After
that is the proxy for physical capital: GDP. Another abundant factor is
managers though the distinction between technical, managerial and
skilled workers may have more to do with job descriptions than with
skill differences. The relatively short dark bars identify factors of
production in which the United States is poorly supplied. According to
these data the U.S. is scarce in population, and in unskilled workers.
A partner for the United States that would be supportive of
globalism would tend to make up these labor scarcities without
exacerbating the energy and physical capital abundance. Mexico is
helpful in that regard, but is not large enough to increase the share of
population or the share of unskilled workers to the combined level of
the GDP share or the shares of several of the other abundant resources.
Canada seems too similar to the United States to offer much deterrent to
the U.S. barriers against labor-intensive products.
Although this figure makes Mexico seem small, the discussion
surrounding Figure 5 indicates that a partner that deters U.S. barriers
can be much smaller than the U.S. if its factor supply is very
different. The most direct way of determining if Mexico is large enough
to deter U.S. protectionism is to compare Mexican output levels with
U.S. import levels as is done in Table 1 using 1984 data. The first
column contains the 1984 Mexican share of U.S. imports. In none of23
these sectors does this current trade share exceed 10 per cent. The
next column, however, contains the relevant ratio: Mexican output
divided by U.S. imports. Here there are quite a few sectors which even
in 1984 there is enough Mexican production to satisfy U.S. import
demand.
The Mexican liberalization that began in 1985 should eventually
generate a substantial increase in productivity and greatly increase the
levels of Mexican output. To get a very rough sense of the potential
effects of productivity increases, data on Italian productivity are used
to compute hypothetical output levels for a liberalized Mexico. These
are reported in the last column of Table 1. With this adjustment there
are many more sectors for which Mexican output would exceed U.S. imports
and therefore deter U.S. protectionism. Two glaring exceptions are
apparel and footwear.
This quick look at some data doesn't allow any strong conclusions,
but that won't hold me back. The North American Free Trade Agreement is
very compatible with global free trade. Indeed if it is not ratified,
we can expect very substantial increases in barriers erected by the
United States especially against Asian products. If it is ratified, the
protective effect of U.S. barriers against Asian products would be
greatly reduced, and these barriers would be less likely to be erected.24
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3411 Puip,Papcr 0.03 11.4423.89
314 Tobacco 0.06 8.3713.06
342 Printing.Publishing 0.01 1.56 4.13
31! Food 0.04 1.45 L96
369 Other Non-Metallic Manufactures ff09 1.37 4,12
352 Other Chemicals 0.01 1.27 2.45
313 Beverages 0.03 124 0.90
321 Textiles 0.02 1.07 3.22
3513 Synthetic Resins 0.04 1.06 3.39
354 Petroleum Products 0.03 0.89 0.91
3522 Drugs,Medicines o.oi 0.78 0.23
362 Glass and Ceramics 0.08 0.60 L63
371 lron.Sueel 0.02039 2.09
356 Plastic Products 0.02 033 iSO
355 Rubber Products 0.01 0.52 1.18
351 Industrial Chemicals 0.04 0.49 1.43
323 Lcathcr, Leather Products 0.01 0,45 137
3511 BasicChemicals 0.05 0.40 1.15
361 Pottcry,China 0.02 038 306
331 Wood Products 0.02 0.31 6.80
341 Papçr 0.02 0.30 0.71
381 Metal Products 0.03 0.29 0.90
353 Petroleum Refineries 0.05 0.29 1.19
332 Furniture (105 0.28 1.15
324 Footwear 0.02 0.25 0.79
322 WearingApparel 0.02 0.14 0.44
372 Non-Ferrous Metal Products 0.05 0.12 0.00
3841 Shipbuilding 023 0.12 3.03
3843 MotorVehicles 0.02 0.11 0,43
384 Transport Equipment 0.02 0.10 0.48
390 Other Industrial Products 0.01 0.09 0.25
382 Machinery 0.02 0.08 0.74
383 EleCtriCal Machinery 0.08 0.08 0.55
385 Professional Instruments 0.03 0.07 0.23
3832 Radio,1V 0.06 0.05 0.29

















































































Categories All data 1990unless otherwise noted
GDPBIIIJS$
Sources European Marketing Data and Statistics
International Marketing Data and Statistics
Population
Source UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics
Data are mid-year international estimates
Unit Millions of Peop'e
Technical Managerial
Skilled tJnskIlIed
Sources European Marketing Data and Statistics
International Marketing Data and Statistics
Units 000's of workers
Technical Includes professional, technical, and related workers
Managerial includes administrative and managerial workers
Skilled Includes clerical, sales, service and related workers
•
Unskilled Compiled by subtracting the above total from totalcountry
population between the ages of 15and 64
Land Area Arab and Penn
Forest Perm Pasture
Source FAQ Annual Production1991
Food and Agriculture Orardzation ofthe United NatIons
Units 000's HA
Land Area Total Land Area
Arab and PerrnArable land and permanent aops




Sources European Marketing Data and StatisticsInternational Marketino Data and Statistics
Notes
Units Metals-'OOO's of metric tonnes
Gold and Silver- Metric Tonnes
Metals Includes bauxite and Won, copper, lead1tin, and zincores
Energy Productlon
Energy Consumption
Sources European Marketing Data and Statistics
International Marketing. Data and Statistics
Energy_Statistics_Yearbook I
UN Dept of International Economic and Social Affairs
Units All data converted Into million tonnes of coal equivalent (MTCE's)
I I I
Energy Includes solid fuels, oil and NOL, natural gas, and electricity
Proven EnergyReserves
Source British_Petroleum
Units Thousand Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent
Reserves includes oil, natural gas, and coal
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